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The cash flow sensitivity of cash
A B S T R A C T
We examine whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric using a sample of 745 firms
from understudied African countries over the period from 2000–2015. We hypothesise and find
significant asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash conditional on cash flow and financial
constraints. Firms with positive cash flow save while those with negative cash flow dissave. These
differences are more apparent in the presence of financial constraints. Our results affirm the asym-
metry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash and highlight the severity of the impact of financial
constraints on corporate decisions in emerging markets.
1. Introduction
The relationship between cash and cash flow, the cash flow sensitivity of cash, is a contentious issue in the literature.
Almeida et al. (2004), Grullon et al. (2018), Khurana et al. (2006) and McLean and Zhao (2018) find a positive cash flow sensitiv-
ity of cash, which they link to the need to hedge against future shortfalls. On the other hand, Riddick and Whited (2009) report a
negative cash flow sensitivity of cash. They attribute the positive relationship in prior studies to mismeasurement error in Tobin’s q
that if corrected via generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators results in negative relation. Using an augmented framework
of Riddick and Whited (2009), Bao et al. (2012) affirmed the negative cash flow sensitivity of cash. However, Chang et al. (2014)
have subsequently shown that estimates of cash flow sensitivities based on higher-order moments of the modified generalised
method of moments (GMM) (see Erickson and Whited, 2000; 2002; 2012) are in some cases economically implausible. Similarly,
Almeida et al. (2010) show that estimators using high-order moments are inefficient and return unstable coefficients that are not
economically meaningful in the real world. Therefore, these mixed findings and conclusions highlight the need for further research.
It is interesting to note that all the above studies, except for the cross-country studies of Khurana et al. (2006) and McLean and
Zhao (2018), focus on developed economies, which limits the generalisability of the findings to emerging economies with markedly
different institutional settings. Yet, the few extant studies in emerging economies find significant heterogeneity in firm financ-
ing arising from differences in the level of access to capital markets. For example, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) find that institu-
tional infrastructure and non-traditional factors significantly influence corporate debt in underdeveloped African markets. Simi-
larly, Amaeshi et al. (2016) document that institutional voids (the absence of intermediaries) in Africa limit access to external fi
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nance, and where the finance is available, it is costly and accompanied by restrictive covenants.1 Guariglia and Yang (2018) also
report that 90% of total financing for individually owned Chinese firms is from self-financing sources such as cash reserves, loans
from relatives and retained earnings. To the extent that African firms rely mostly on internal financing sources, they provide an ideal
independent sample to reconcile and generalise empirical findings as savings from internally generated cash flow are likely to be high
and heterogeneous within this context. To the extent that capital markets in Africa are different from developed economies where
studies are concentrated, they offer unique institutional settings to validate extant propositions or theories.2 Therefore, examining
whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash for African firms is positive or negative and, if it is asymmetric or not, represents an inter-
esting research question.3
In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing debate on the cash flow sensitivity of cash by providing further empirical evidence
from emerging markets which are understudied in the literature. We conjure that limited access to external finance in emerging
economies is likely to make changes in cash (savings) more sensitive to operating cash flow and that this sensitivity is asymmetric
conditional on cash flow (positive versus negative cash flow) and financial constraints. Using a sample of 745 firms (7280 firm-year
observations) drawn from eight African countries over the period from 2000 to 2015, we examine whether the cash flow sensitivity
of cash is asymmetric and how financial constraints impact on the cash flow sensitivity of cash. Our findings which are robust to
the choice of estimation technique show that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive and asymmetric conditional on cash flow.
Specifically, for a one standard deviation increase in cash flow, the average firm increases cash holdings by 3.28%. When comparing
the cash flow sensitivity of cash conditional on cash flow, we find that firms with positive cash flow increase their cash holdings
by 3.71% for a one standard deviation increase in cash flow, which is 52% higher than firms with negative cash flow (2.44%). We
further find that the asymmetry between firms with positive and negative cash flow varies significantly with financial constraints.
Consistent with our hypothesis, only constrained firms with positive cash flow save relatively more than unconstrained firms, while
constrained firms with negative cash flows dissave much more than their unconstrained counterparts. These differences show that
financial constraints increase the asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash in the context of emerging economies where firms
have limited access to external sources of finance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, Section 3 presents the data used in the analyses,
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
To examine the asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash, we estimate the following model:
(1)
where is the change in cash holdings for firm in country at time γ0 is a constant, and and β are parameters to
be estimated, is the firm’s cash flow, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that report negative cash
flow and otherwise, zero, is vectors of firm-specific characteristics explained below, νj and νt are the country and time fixed
effects, and ϵijt is the error term. The vector, consists of Tobin’s q (Q), the logarithm of total assets (Size), change in total debt
(ΔTDA) and change in property, plant and equipment (ΔPPE).
The extant literature informs the control variables used. For example, Almeida et al. (2004), Khurana et al. (2006) and
Bao et al. (2012) find that Tobin’s q has a positive effect on changes in cash holdings as high-growth firms save more from operating
cash flow to finance future growth opportunities. For firm-size, Khurana et al. (2006) find it has a positive effect on changes in cash.
This arises as firm-size is an indicator of access to external finance and the cost of capital (Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Riddick and
Whited, 2009). Larger firms are more able to save as they have better access to external finance (Almeida et al., 2004; Almeida and
Campello, 2007) and economies of scale in managing cash holdings (Khurana et al., 2006; Bao et al., 2012). Several studies find that
collateral (PPE) is associated with better access to external finance (Campello and Giambona, 2013; Flor and Hirth, 2013; Lei et al.,
2018). This should reduce the need to hoard cash and lead to a negative relationship between and . However, the effect
of is not apparent as some studies find that debt is a substitute for cash (Opler et al., 1999; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Kling
et al., 2014), while others find a complementary relationship (Acharya et al., 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Flannery and Lock-
hart, 2009). Based on the aforementioned studies, we expect firm-size and Tobin’s q to have a positive effect on while
should have a negative effect. As the literature is not clear on what effect has on we, therefore, do make a prediction
for this variable.
We next estimate a modified version of our initial model to capture the effect of financial constraints on the cash flow sensitivity
as follows:-
1 Bae and Goyal (2009) find that lenders shorten maturities, reduce loan amounts and increase spread when lending in environments characterised by poor legal
enforcement.
2 Notwithstanding the contributions of the cross-country studies of Khurana et al. (2006) and McLean and Zhao (2018), they do not provide a complete picture of
firms operating in African markets as their sample only includes South Africa.
3 The extant studies in emerging markets do not examine corporate savings behaviour which is somewhat surprising given the surge in cash holdings documented
in developed countries (see Foley et al., 2007; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Bates et al., 2009).
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(2)
where is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if we categorise a firm as constrained and otherwise zero, and
are parameters to be estimated. We categorise a firm in each year as constrained (unconstrained) if it is below (above) the median
distribution of the logarithm of market capitalisation (MktCap), firm-age and tangibility. For our categorisation based on the WW
Index (Whited, 2006), we consider a firm to be constrained (unconstrained) if it is above (below) the median distribution of the WW
Index in each year. We use the median to categorise firms into regimes rather than the upper (lower) quartiles or deciles as this
reduces the likelihood of finding significant cross-sectional differences between constrained and unconstrained sub-samples.
To facilitate comparison with prior studies and for robustness, we estimate Eq. (1) using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS),
fixed effects (FE), instrumental variables (IV) and generalised method of moments (GMM3-GMM5). We estimate our main model,
Eq. (2), using the generalised method of moments (GMM5) based on higher-order moments that account for potential mis-measure-
ment errors in Tobin’s q (see, Erickson and Whited, 2000; 2002; Bao et al., 2012).
3. Data
We collect data from Datastream over period 2000–2015 and exclude firms in the financial and utility sectors, and those with
missing data. To reduce the effects of outliers, we winsorise all variables at the upper and bottom 1% percentiles of the distribution.
Our final sample consists of 7,280 firm-year observations for 745 firms from Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
South Africa and Tunisia. We describe in detail each of the variables in Appendix A.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics and correlations for all variables. The mean (median) change in cash (ΔCash), cash flow
(CF), Tobin’s q (Q), size (Size), change in debt (ΔDebt), change in property, plant and equipment (ΔPPE), and R&D are 1.3% (0.6%),
15.3% (14.3%), 1.60 (1.35), 15.08 (15.20), 2.1% (0.1%), 3.6% (1.9%), 0.1% (0), respectively. The pairwise correlations in Panel B
show that change in cash (ΔCash) is positively correlated with cash flow (CF), Tobin’s q (Q) and change in debt (ΔDebt), while it is
negatively correlated with size (Size), change in property, plant and equipment (ΔPPE), and research and development ( ).
4. Empirical results
We first examine whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric conditional on cash flow, and if this asymmetry is af-
fected by financial constraints. Table 2 presents the results estimating Eq. (1) that relates the change in cash to firm characteristics.
Table 2 shows that the cash flow sensitivity of cash ranges between 0.265 and 0.458. Our estimate of the cash flow sensitivity
of cash in Columns (4)–(6) using generalised method of moments (GMM3–GMM5) based on higher-order moments to correct for
potential measurement errors are relatively higher than those in Columns (1)–(3) based on pooled ordinary least squares (OLS),
fixed effects (FE), and instrumental variables (IV), respectively. Columns (4)–(6) show the average firm increases cash holdings by
26.5%-44.9%. This result is consistent with the need to preserve financing flexibility, the precautionary motive of holding cash, in
order to hedge any future shortfalls, especially in less developed capital markets where access to external finance is limited. The
coefficients of CF × DNeg × DFC, in Columns (7)–(12), are consistently negative and significant, indicating that the cash flow sensi-
tivity of cash is asymmetry conditional on cash flow. Specifically, firms with negative cash flow shocks tend to dissave 12.3%–32.6%
while those with positive shocks save 29.9%–45.8% in anticipation of future cash shortfalls.4 These findings affirm the asymmetry
in the cash flow sensitivity of cash but differ from Bao et al. (2012) in that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive (negative) for
firms with positive (negative) cash flow rather than negative (positive). We attribute these differences to the overreaching need to
enhance or increase financial flexibility by hoarding cash and then drawing down cash reserves to cover negative cash flow shocks
in environments characterised by limited access to external finance.
Consistent with prior literature, we find that and have a positive and negative effect on respectively. The
negative effect of is in line with Flannery and Lockhart (2009) and Kling et al. (2014) who find that firms with better access
to external finance hold less cash reserves. For the positive effect of we link this result to a host of studies that find a comple-
mentary relationship between debt and cash holdings (see Acharya et al., 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Flannery and Lockhart,
2009). However, the negative effect of Tobin’s q and size on is inconsistent with the literature (Almeida et al., 2004; Khurana
et al., 2006; Bao et al., 2012). This finding is somewhat surprising and suggests that changes in cash holdings within the African
context are not due to the need to finance future growth opportunities. Instead, financial constraints appear to be the main reasons
for the rise in corporate savings, as evidenced by the negative coefficient of firm-size (which is a proxy for credit constraints). Given
our focus and for brevity, we do not further discuss the results of control variables.
We next examine the impact of financial constraints on the cash flow sensitivity conditional on the WW Index (Whited, 2006),
market capitalisation (MktCap), firm-age and tangibility. Financial constraints are more likely to be binding for firms in developing
markets as access to external finance is limited. This prediction should lead to a high asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash
for African firms. Table 3 presents the results estimating Eq. (2) that relates the change in cash to firm characteristics and financial
constraint indicators.
4 Appendix B shows similar asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash for firms in South Africa and for those in other countries (excluding South Africa).
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Table 1
Basic statistics and correlations. Panel A presents the basic statistics, and Panel B presents the pairwise Spearman (Pearson) correlations in the upper (lower) diagonal
for all variables used. The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia drawn
from Datastream over the period from 2000 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, **,
* indicate the significance of the difference between positive cash flow firms (CF > 0) and negative cash flow firms (CF ≤ 0) at the one, five, and ten percent levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Basic statistics
All firms CF > 0 CF ≤ 0
Variables Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
ΔCash 0.013 0.006 0.073 0.017 0.008 0.071 −0.029*** −0.019*** 0.079***
CF 0.153 0.143 0.124 0.174 0.154 0.107 −0.074*** −0.053*** 0.061***
Q 1.600 1.345 0.860 1.628 1.376 0.868 1.275*** 1.088*** 0.683***
Size 15.080 15.202 2.019 15.099 15.224 1.996 14.856*** 14.951** 2.249***
ΔDebt 0.021 0.001 0.084 0.022 0.001 0.082 0.015** 0.004 0.102***
ΔPPE 0.036 0.019 0.084 0.040 0.022 0.082 −0.012*** −0.007*** 0.091***
0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000*** 0.003***
N 7,280 6,689 591
Panel B: Correlations
Variables ΔCash CF Q Size ΔDebt ΔPPE
ΔCash 1 0.340*** 0.035*** −0.028** 0.028** −0.021* −0.017
CF 0.359*** 1 0.418*** −0.005 0.108*** 0.310*** −0.001
Q 0.013 0.388*** 1 0.182*** 0.072*** 0.231*** 0.060***
Size −0.028** 0.004 0.127*** 1 0.116*** 0.144*** 0.237***
ΔDebt 0.058*** 0.153*** 0.060*** 0.098*** 1 0.401*** 0.032***
ΔPPE −0.019 0.285*** 0.138*** 0.076*** 0.413*** 1 0.020*
−0.036*** 0.021* 0.025** 0.097*** 0.056*** −0.002 1
For all proxies of financial constraints, the coefficient of the interaction term of cash flow and the dummy of financial constraint,
CF × DFC, is positive and significant, indicating that constrained firms save 6.4%-19.3% more than unconstrained firms. The results
suggest that constrained firms have a higher need to hoard cash in a bid to enhance financial flexibility and hedge against future
shortfalls. However, constrained firms with adverse cash flow shocks dissave 5.2%-57.9% more than their unconstrained counter-
parts. A comparison of the pre-crisis (2000–2007) and post-crisis (2008–2015) period shows that the asymmetry increases in the
post-crisis period, which is marked by significant contractions in credit supply. This finding suggests that firms draw-down cash when
credit supply contracts and those that can still generate positive cash flow further hoard it to strategically increase financial flexibil-
ity.
Overall, our results show significant asymmetry between firms with negative and positive cash flow that is more pronounced with
financial constraints in emerging markets.
5. Conclusion
We examine the asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a sample of understudied African firms. Our study affirms
that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric as it is positive and negative for firms with positive and negative cash flow, re-
spectively. This asymmetry is more pronounced for firms that are subject to financial constraints, as constrained firms with negative
cash flow dissave while those with positive cash flow save a higher proportion of their operating cash flow. Our findings are in line
with the literature from the developed countries, but the magnitudes and asymmetry of the cash flow sensitivity of cash are much
higher as Africa firms face limited access to external finance.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Michael Machokoto: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. Ge-
ofry Areneke: Data curation, Writing - review & editing.
Appendix A. Variable definitions
The table lists the definitions of all variables used and the account items obtained from Datastream databases.
Variable Definition
Cash Change in cash holdings to total assets.
cash flow Earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus the change in non-cash working capital to total assets.
DNeg A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has negative cash flow and otherwise zero.
Q Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s ).
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Table 2
Asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The table presents the estimation results of Eqs. (1) and (2) that relate investment to cash flow and Tobin’s q. τ is the coefficient of determination of Equation (2) in Erickson and Whited (2000)
and is an index that varies between zero and one of measurement quality for the Tobin’s q. The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia drawn from
Datastream over the period from 2000 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, **, * indicate significance at one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Estimation OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CF 0.265*** 0.309*** 0.315*** 0.449*** 0.331*** 0.351*** 0.299*** 0.356*** 0.353*** 0.458*** 0.351*** 0.388***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.052) (0.026) (0.020)
DNeg −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.019*** −0.018***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CF × DNeg −0.478*** −0.542*** −0.476*** −0.784*** −0.578*** −0.650***
(0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.115) (0.069) (0.062)
Q −0.012*** −0.010*** 0.009 −0.090*** −0.041*** −0.049*** −0.014*** −0.012*** 0.006 −0.067*** −0.032*** −0.044***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006)
Size −0.001** −0.024*** −0.032*** 0.004** 0.001 0.001* −0.001* −0.024*** −0.032*** 0.003** 0.001 0.001*
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ΔDebt 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.080*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.047*** 0.032** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
ΔPPE −0.131*** −0.179*** −0.206*** −0.082*** −0.112*** −0.107*** −0.130*** −0.172*** −0.190*** −0.094*** −0.117*** −0.109***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)
N 7,280 7,280 5,045 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 5,045 7,280 7,280 7,280
R 2 0.173 0.208 0.213 0.186 0.224 0.228
τ 0.276 0.406 0.366 0.359 0.540 0.443
ρ 0.387 0.267 0.205 0.215 0.391 0.257 0.207 0.224
Table 3
The effect of financial constraints on the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The table presents estimation results of Equation (2) that relate investment to cash flow and Tobin’s q. τ is the coefficient of determination of Eq. (2) in Erickson and
Whited (2000) and is an index that varies between zero and one of measurement quality for the Tobin’s q. The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and
Tunisia drawn from Datastream over the period from 2000 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, **, * indicate significance at one, five, and ten percent levels,
respectively.
Period 2000–2015 2000–2007 2008–2015
Constraint WW MktCap Firm-age Tangibility WW MktCap Firm-age Tangibility WW MktCap Firm-Age Tangibility
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CF 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.303*** 0.347*** 0.374*** 0.388*** 0.324*** 0.399*** 0.260*** 0.251*** 0.294*** 0.307***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042) (0.041) (0.033) (0.037)
DNeg −0.011* −0.008 −0.017** 0.002 0.009 0.005 −0.002 0.009 −0.021*** −0.015** −0.033*** −0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
CF × DNeg −0.470*** −0.456*** −0.483*** −0.501*** −0.517*** −0.633*** −0.593*** −0.623*** −0.426*** −0.379*** −0.505*** −0.461***
(0.065) (0.068) (0.062) (0.066) (0.134) (0.114) (0.110) (0.125) (0.088) (0.089) (0.082) (0.090)
DFC −0.026*** −0.028*** −0.027*** −0.007 −0.016** −0.014** −0.027*** −0.001 −0.030*** −0.033*** −0.025*** −0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
CF × DFC 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.152*** 0.121*** 0.087** 0.064* 0.151*** 0.097*** 0.182*** 0.193*** 0.140*** 0.127***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033)
DNeg × DFC −0.018* −0.027*** −0.002 −0.035*** −0.049*** −0.052*** −0.042** −0.032* −0.008 −0.018 0.014 −0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
CF × DNeg × DFC −0.332*** −0.376*** −0.282*** −0.303** −0.206 −0.052 −0.123 0.224 −0.496*** −0.579*** −0.395*** −0.505***
(0.100) (0.105) (0.100) (0.130) (0.155) (0.144) (0.150) (0.195) (0.143) (0.142) (0.146) (0.164)
Q −0.037*** −0.037*** −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.059*** −0.062*** −0.054*** −0.065*** −0.026*** −0.024** −0.038*** −0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Size −0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.004*** −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ΔDebt 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.033** 0.017 0.025 0.020 0.009 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.044***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
ΔPPE −0.115*** −0.116*** −0.108*** −0.085*** −0.089*** −0.088*** −0.088*** −0.064*** −0.130*** −0.133*** −0.124*** −0.102***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
N 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 4,335 4,335 4,335 4,335
τ 0.526 0.529 0.497 0.495 0.492 0.489 0.508 0.478 0.601 0.633 0.499 0.545
ρ 0.234 0.235 0.239 0.244 0.263 0.265 0.270 0.278 0.211 0.212 0.220 0.216
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Size Log of total assets.
Debt Change in total debt to total assets.
PPE Change in property, plant and equipment to total assets.
DFC A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is constrained and otherwise zero.
WW Index
The WW Index (WW) is based on Whited (2006).
MktCap Log of market capitalisation.
LogAge The logarithm of the difference between the current year and the first year that the firm
appears in the database.
Tangibility Tangible fixed assets to total assets.
Appendix B. Alternative estimates of the cash flow sensitivity of cash
The table presents the estimation results of Eqs. (1) and (2) that relate investment to cash flow and Tobin’s q. τ is the coefficient
of determination of Eq. (2) in Erickson and Whited (2000) and is an index that varies between zero and one of measurement qual-
ity for the Tobin’s q. Panel A and B present the results for the firms in South Africa and other countries (excluding South Africa),
respectively. The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South
Africa and Tunisia drawn from Datastream over the period from 2000 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are
winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, **, * indicate significance at one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Pane A: South Africa
Estima-
tion
OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.249*** 0.282*** 0.294*** 0.528*** 0.328*** 0.337*** 0.292*** 0.331*** 0.335*** 0.558*** 0.370*** 0.394***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.070) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.077) (0.026) (0.024)
0.016*** 0.015** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
CF DNeg 0.466*** 0.508*** 0.481*** 1.038*** 0.635*** 0.687***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.186) (0.074) (0.071)
0.010***
0.010*** 0.005 0.140*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.002 0.107*** 0.041*** 0.049***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.035) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.028) (0.008) (0.007)
0.001* 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.010*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.008*** 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
0.050*** 0.037** 0.065*** 0.100*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.036** 0.020 0.046*** 0.051** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
0.124***
0.164*** 0.193*** 0.023 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.120*** 0.154*** 0.174*** 0.042 0.095*** 0.088***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015)
N 5,906 5,906 4,217 5,906 5,906 5,906 5,906 5,906 4,217 5,906 5,906 5,906
0.158 0.181 0.195 0.172 0.196 0.209
0.232 0.332 0.321 0.296 0.431 0.393
0.329 0.259 0.184 0.187 0.336 0.261 0.195 0.204
Pane B: Other countries
Estima-
tion
OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.345*** 0.439*** 0.455*** 0.323*** 0.390*** 0.395*** 0.352*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 0.175 0.317*** 0.376***
(0.022) (0.037) (0.027) (0.097) (0.068) (0.037) (0.024) (0.039) (0.031) (0.174) (0.102) (0.042)
0.033** 0.032** 0.011 0.045** 0.036** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015)
CF DNeg 0.476*** 0.709*** 0.316 0.276 0.442** 0.512***
(0.145) (0.179) (0.207) (0.259) (0.183) (0.152)
0.018***
0.010** 0.030 0.012 0.030 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.032 0.023 0.010 0.024***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.050) (0.025) (0.019) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.050) (0.037) (0.023) (0.007)
0.003***
0.051*** 0.063** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.051*** 0.065** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.095*** 0.091*** 0.008 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.001 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.090***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
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0.174***
0.254*** 0.276*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.180*** 0.262*** 0.278*** 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.184***
(0.034) (0.044) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.038) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035)
N 1,374 1,374 828 1,374 1,374 1,374 1,374 1,374 828 1,374 1,374 1,374
0.277 0.372 0.345 0.285 0.387 0.343
1.453 0.677 0.658 0.423 1.665 0.822
0.780 0.246 0.301 0.305 0.779 0.151 0.249 0.290
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.frl.2020.101440
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